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Abstract
This article examines the evolution of UNHCR’s urban refugee 
policy from the mid-1990s to the present. It focuses on the 
complex and contested nature of the policymaking process, 
analyzing the roles that internal and external stakeholders 
have played in it. At the same time, the article identifies 
and examines key developments in UNHCR’s operational 
environment that drove and constrained policymaking in 
this domain. The article is written from the perspective of a 
former UNHCR staff member who was substantively engaged 
in urban refugee policy.
Résumé
Cet article étudie l’évolution de la politique urbaine relative 
aux réfugiés, menée par le HCR du milieu des années 90 à 
aujourd’hui. Il cible la nature complexe et contestée du pro-
cessus de prise de décisions politiques, analysant le rôle joué 
de ce point de vue par différentes parties prenantes internes 
et externes. En même temps, il détermine et examine les 
évolutions clés de l’environnement opérationnel du HCR, 
qui ont été à la fois motrices et contraignantes vis-à-vis du 
processus de prise de décisions politiques dans ce domaine. 
Cet article est rédigé à partir de la perspective d’un ancien 
membre du personnel du HCR qui a été très engagé en 
matière de la politique urbaine relative aux réfugiés.
Introduction
During the past two decades, the issue of urban refu-gees has occupied an increasingly important place on the global refugee policy agenda. This article 
traces the evolution of UNHCR’s approach to the issue, focus-
ing particularly on the complex and contested nature of the 
organization’s policymaking process. 
In that respect, the article examines the key drivers of—
and constraints to—policy formulation during the period 
under review, examining the ways in which those drivers 
and constraints changed and interacted over time. The arti-
cle also analyzes the role that different stakeholders, both 
internal and external to UNHCR, have played in policy for-
mulation. As a result of these dynamics, the article concludes, 
the formulation of UNHCR policy on urban refugees has been 
slow and even tortuous.
The article is written from the perspective of a former 
UNHCR staff member who was extensively engaged in the 
organization’s policymaking and who was responsible for 
researching and drafting its 2009 policy on refugee protec-
tion and solutions in urban areas. The following account 
draws extensively from the author’s access to discussions, 
documents, and other information that have not been placed 
in the public domain. While striving for analytical and 
academic rigour, the article inevitably reflects the position, 
experiences, and personal views of the author. 
Origins of the 1997 Policy
One of the first references to refugees in urban areas of 
developing countries appears in a 1967 statement by the 
UN high commissioner for refugees, Prince Sadruddin Aga 
Khan. “We are confronted more and more frequently,” he 
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said, “with a new problem and with a new class of refugees: 
on the one hand, the students, who are to some extent the 
élite of the African refugees, and, on the other, refugees who 
are not employed in agriculture and who are at present con-
centrated in urban areas and in the big African capitals.”1 
Despite this early identification of the urban refugee issue, 
it was not until the 1980s and 1990s that UNHCR, its govern-
mental and non-governmental partners, and the academic 
community began to give this topic more concerted atten-
tion. The timing of that development can be attributed to 
four principal factors. 
First, the number of urban refugees in developing coun-
tries was steadily growing, as was international awareness of 
their presence. Thus between 1984 and 1993, UNHCR under-
took internal reviews of its assistance programs for urban 
refugees in a number of different locations, including Brazil, 
Guatemala, Mexico, Turkey, Zimbabwe, and several other 
African states.
Urban refugees also began to attract the attention of 
researchers and commentators, particularly in Africa. In 
1976, Robert Chambers estimated the continent’s urban 
refugee population to be in the region of 15,000, but just 
three years later, Brian Neldner revised that figure to over 
200,000.2 
Certain urban refugee populations in Africa came under 
particular academic scrutiny. In 1979, for example, Louise 
Pirouet prepared a conference paper on urban refugees in 
the Kenyan capital of Nairobi. In 1985, Wendy Wallace drew 
attention to the growing number of refugees living in the 
Sudanese capital of Khartoum, an issue that was subsequently 
explored in greater detail by Gaim Kibreab. At the end of 
the 1980s, research undertaken by Derek Cooper began to 
explore the situation of refugees in Cairo, Egypt, while Marc 
Sommers and Roos Willems both turned their attention to 
exiles living in the Tanzanian capital of Dar-es-Salaam.3 
Second, and as already indicated by Sadruddin Aga Khan 
in his 1967 statement, urban refugees were regarded and 
conceived as a problem, even by the most sympathetic com-
mentators. Louise Pirouet, for example, who was an ardent 
advocate for refugee rights, made these observations in her 
1979 paper on refugees in Nairobi, which was tellingly subti-
tled “Small Numbers, Large Problems”:
Urban refugees are usually articulate, aware of at least some of 
their rights, and expect something more than mere subsistence 
… They are able to organize themselves, and are therefore seen as 
a potential political danger … The number of refugees in Nairobi 
has never been large. Yet the presence of only a few thousand refu-
gees created large problems, swelling—as it did—the ranks of the 
urban poor with people who demanded that they should be helped 
to something better than mere survival in the Nairobi slums and 
shanty towns, thus arousing resentment among the Kenyan poor 
who could not even draw the minimum subsistence rates paid to 
refugees.4
Third, while there might have been a growing awareness 
of urban refugees and the difficulties associated with them, 
UNHCR failed to develop an organizational policy or any 
operational guidelines in this domain.
In 1995, for example, an internal discussion paper 
observed, “Organizational policy regarding urban refugees 
is particularly weak and unclear, and practice, in terms of 
both protection and assistance, tends to vary substantially.” 
Although reviews of the organization’s urban refugee assis-
tance programs had been undertaken throughout the previ-
ous decade, “their recommendations dealt exclusively with 
the specific objectives of the programmes under examina-
tion and made no reference to broader policy issues.” The 
discussion paper consequently recommended “the establish-
ment of a comprehensive policy on urban refugees.”5
A fourth driver of UNHCR policy at this time was funding. 
From 1989 onwards, UNHCR expanded very rapidly, largely as 
a result of new emergencies in the Balkans and Great Lakes 
region of Africa, as well as large-scale repatriation opera-
tions that became possible as armed conflicts in Southeast 
Asia, Southern Africa, and Central America came to an end. 
As a result of these developments, the organization’s budget 
(most of which is provided by voluntary contributions from 
donor states) jumped from $570 million in 1989 to $960 mil-
lion in 1996, an increase of 68 per cent.6 
Within the organization, concerns were mounting about 
the sustainability of this growth pattern and a fear that UNHCR 
would soon be confronted with a serious financial shortfall. 
Thus at the opening of the 1996 meeting of the organization’s 
governing body, the Executive Committee, High Commis-
sioner Sadako Ogata said that while the projected budget for 
the coming year stood at $1.3 billion, only $776 million had 
actually been contributed. “I appeal especially to the donors 
here present,” she said, “to make an extra effort for the seri-
ous shortfall in our operations.” 
As well as appealing for additional funds, the high com-
missioner initiated a campaign to find efficiency savings, and, 
in her words, “to deliver the changes necessary for UNHCR 
to perform better with less.”7 In this context, urban refugee 
assistance budgets came under particularly close examina-
tion, partly because they had been steadily rising, but also 
because on a per capita basis they were thought to be far 
more expensive than supporting refugees in camps or rural 
settlements. 
UNHCR’s examination of its operational refugee budgets 
also revealed that a growing number of urban refugees 
were being given monthly cash handouts indefinitely and 
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without obligation to establish a livelihood. Amongst many 
UNHCRstaff, there was a mounting perception that those 
refugees had succumbed to the “dependency syndrome,” had 
developed an unwarranted sense of entitlement, and had no 
real incentive to become self-reliant. They had become, in a 
popular phrase at that time, “professional refugees.” 
The 1997 Policy
In response, UNHCR established an Urban Refugee Working 
Group, which in March 1997 produced a “comprehensive 
policy on urban refugees.” The twenty-three-page document 
starts out conventionally and uncontroversially enough, 
observing that the principal objectives of the policy “are to 
ensure protection and to maximize access to solutions, both 
for individual refugees and for groups.”8
As it progresses, however, the policy places an increas-
ingly exclusive emphasis on the difficulties and costs asso-
ciated with the presence of refugees in urban areas. Urban 
refugees, it says, are “a global problem.” Many urban refu-
gees come from countries with “a long history of migration 
related to trade and/or a nomadic tradition,” or “a history of 
economically-driven migration … or have been involved in 
aliens trafficking.”
Having raised such questions about their bona fides, the 
policy makes a series of negative generalizations about the 
world’s urban refugees. They are “predominantly young, 
single (or separated) males.” “While constituting less than 
two per cent of UNHCR’s refugee caseload,” they “demand a 
disproportionate amount (estimated at 10 to 15 per cent) of 
the organization’s human and financial resources.” 
Donor states, the policy points out, “have become increas-
ingly selective in terms of the programmes they support … and 
show little enthusiasm for long-term care and maintenance of 
urban cases.” As for the refugees themselves, “life in urban 
areas does not constitute an answer to their problem and may 
well be significantly more difficult than in a rural settlement.” 
Three issues feature particularly strongly in the 1997 policy. 
The first is that of “irregular movers,” a topic that occupies no 
less than a quarter of the document. In contrast, the paper 
did not include a section on the application of UNHCR’s pro-
tection mandate to refugees in urban contexts.
According to the policy paper, “a majority of urban cases” 
consist of refugees “who move in an irregular manner from 
countries in which they have already found protection in 
order to seek asylum or permanent settlement elsewhere.” 
Such irregular movements are caused both by “push factors” 
in the country of first asylum (“intolerance, insecurity, pov-
erty”) and by “pull factors” in other states (“better economic 
conditions, higher levels of care and maintenance assistance, 
access to secondary and tertiary education, better resettle-
ment opportunities”). 
While recognizing that “the right of refugees to effective 
and adequate protection is inviolate and is therefore not 
affected by irregular movement,” the policy concludes that 
“UNHCR has an interest in the adoption of measures to reduce 
irregular movements.”
A second dominant issue is that of assistance and self-reli-
ance. In the words of the policy, refugees and asylum seekers 
arriving in urban areas “have often travelled long distances, 
using organized transportation as opposed to travelling on 
foot.” “They have paid for their transport, food and lodgings 
needs en route. It should therefore not be assumed … that 
he/she is necessarily destitute.” 
The policy goes on to suggest that providing long-term 
assistance to urban refugees “keeps them dependent and 
undermines their coping mechanisms, leading to marginali-
zation, frustration and often violence. It also favours unjustly 
the individual treatment of urban cases compared to those in 
rural settlements and camps.” 
The third issue to emerge very strongly from the 1997 
policy is that of security. In a section titled “Violence,” the 
document states that “it is often those individuals who suc-
ceed in moving from one country to another… who become 
aggressive and violent if their expectations are not met.” 
Amongst urban refugees, “hunger strikes, demonstrations, 
physical assault … and suicide threats are now common-
place.” Particular problems can be expected from “rejected 
cases, those refused assistance as well as the psychologically 
disturbed.” “Giving in to violent forms of protest,” the policy 
concludes, “does not pay, but on the contrary exacerbates 
long-term problems.” 
On the basis of this analysis, the 1997 paper sets out a 
number of policy provisions.
First, there is a “legitimate urban caseload,” consisting 
of refugees who come from an urban background and have 
been recognized as refugees on an individual basis, as well as 
prima facie refugees who are obliged to take up residence in 
an urban area for security or protection. There might also be 
“rare exceptions” amongst the prima facie refugees who have 
to leave their camp or settlement temporarily and move to 
an urban area for education, medical care, or family reunion.
Second, while some members of the “legitimate” urban 
refugee caseload might require and be entitled to assistance, 
such support should be “strictly time-limited—no more than 
three months—and given with the objective of supporting a 
refugee’s efforts towards self-sufficiency.” 
Third, refugees who are part of a prima facie caseload “for 
whom a UNHCR assistance programme exists in a rural camp 
or settlement … should, as a general principle, not be pro-
vided with assistance.” When such refugees cannot support 
themselves in an urban environment, “consideration should 
be given to transferring them to a rural camp or settlement.”
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Fourth, refugees should “remain as close as possible 
to their country of origin.” Irregular onward movements 
should be reduced, and arrangements should be introduced 
“for the return of refugees and asylum seekers to countries 
where they had or could have sought asylum.”
Finally, when urban refugees engage in what are deemed 
to be illegitimate and violent protests, “it is not appropriate 
for UNHCR to intervene.” “UNHCR staff should not hesitate to 
seek the intervention of the local authorities … and call in 
the police.”
Reactions to the 1997 Policy
While the 1997 paper filled an important gap in UNHCR’s pol-
icy repertoire, it did not lay the issue of urban refugees to rest. 
Indeed, the new policy proved to be highly controversial and 
one that, in the words of one Human Rights Watch report, 
was “heavily criticized both internally and externally.” The 
Human Rights Watch report went on to say that the purpose 
of the policy “was unabashedly to reduce programmes for 
urban refugees and to prevent refugees from locating to an 
urban environment.” The policy “focuses almost exclusively 
on assistance and ignores the very real protection needs of 
refugees in urban areas.” As far as UNHCR was concerned, 
urban refugees remain “a policy blind spot.”9
Confronted with such antagonistic reactions, in Decem-
ber 1997 UNHCR hurriedly issued a revised version of the 
policy, the organization’s protection responsibilities towards 
refugees in urban areas.10 But that did not satisfy the NGO 
community, which continued to complain that the docu-
ment placed excessive emphasis on assistance to urban refu-
gees and on the irregular nature of their movement to urban 
areas.
The issue came to a head in the third quarter of 1999, when 
NGO participants in a consultation meeting with UNHCR 
demanded to know what the organization’s intentions were 
on its urban refugee policy. Thinking on his feet, a senior 
UNHCR official acknowledged the NGOs’ concerns and made 
an unscheduled promise that the organization would under-
take a thorough review and revision of the 1997 policy. He 
then turned to UNHCR’s Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit 
(EPAU) to undertake this task. 
EPAU’s capacity to assume this responsibility was limited. 
It was a relatively new entity, established in September 1998 
and staffed by just three people, only one of whom had expe-
rience in evaluation and policy analysis. 
EPAU also had other priorities to address. As well as 
reviewing UNHCR’s urban refugee policy, the unit was asked 
to examine UNHCR’s role in protracted refugee situations, its 
emergency response capacity, its engagement with internally 
displaced populations, and its community services. At the 
same time, EPAU was to strengthen UNHCR’s evaluation 
methods and enhance the organization’s cooperation with 
the academic and research communities.11 
As a first step in its efforts to review UNHCR’s urban refugee 
policy, in 2000 EPAU undertook a desk-based global survey, 
to identify key issues for further research and analysis. As a 
second step, and in the same year, a number of geographi-
cally diverse locations were selected for a more detailed 
review, based primarily on the size of their urban refugee 
populations. They included New Delhi, Cairo, Nairobi, and 
Bangkok, as well as Eastern Europe.12 
The 2003 paper engaged directly with many of the NGOs’ 
criticisms that had been levelled at the 1997 policy. Specifi-
cally, it emphasized the need for UNHCR to develop a stronger 
protection focus in its work with refugees and, rebutting a 
key principle of the 1997 policy, argued that UNHCR’s engage-
ment with urban refugee populations must “go some way 
beyond providing the minimum level of support for the 
shortest possible time.” In addition, the document placed 
new emphasis on the need for UNHCR to advocate on behalf 
of the civil and socio-economic rights of urban refugees and 
to provide substantive support to their cultural, social, rec-
reational, and sporting activities.
While the 2003 EPAU paper was intended to provide the 
basis for a new urban refugee policy, it did not. As one exter-
nal commentator observed, “Despite the clear recommenda-
tion of EPAU to withdraw the 1997 policy and to replace it 
with a version of these guiding principles and good practice, 
the draft document has never been made public and, as yet, 
languishes without adoption by UNHCR. In a statement to 
the 2004 Executive Committee meeting of UNHCR, the Inter-
national Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA) expressed 
concern over the failure of UNHCR to accept the draft docu-
ment as policy and to move forward. Indeed, while UNHCR 
has recognized the inadequacies of the 1997 policy, a more 
effective policy has yet to supersede it.”14
In similar vein, Human Rights Watch expressed agreement 
with EPAU’s conclusions, adding, “Unfortunately, EPAU’s rec-
ommendations have not yet been implemented by UNHCR.”15
Policymaking Constraints
UNHCR’s unwillingness to endorse and formalize the guiding 
principles and good practices set out in the 2003 EPAU paper 
was the result of several factors. Most importantly, internal 
discussions revealed that the approach it proposed was too 
radical and rights-based for some managers and staff mem-
bers, who continued to perceive urban refugees as a problem 
and the programs established for them as an expensive lux-
ury, especially when compared to the supposed “efficiency” 
of camp-based approaches.16 
In the course of those discussions, concerns were also 
expressed that the proposed guiding principles would 
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antagonize refugee-hosting countries in developing regions, 
many of whom (as Pirouet had explained twenty years ear-
lier) regarded the presence of refugees in urban areas as “a 
potential political danger.”17 
The resistance of some UNHCR managers to EPAU’s pro-
posals also stemmed from a sense that the organization was 
being bullied and blackmailed by other stakeholders. On 
one hand, they felt that ICVA and other members of the NGO 
community were arrogant in their representations to UNHCR 
on this matter. On the other hand, they resented the fact that 
some urban refugee populations were resisting implementa-
tion of the 1997 policy. 
In New Delhi, for example, assistance payments to urban 
refugees were drastically reduced from 1998 onwards, with 
the ostensible objective of bringing their “dependency syn-
drome” to an end and promoting their self-reliance. But the 
refugees themselves (primarily Afghans) felt that they had 
been the victims of a cost-cutting exercise and complained 
that their legal, social, and material status in India made it 
impossible for them to support themselves. The relationship 
between refugees and UNHCR in the Indian capital broke 
down, and violent protests ensued.18 
In keeping with the “violence must not be allowed to pay” 
approach of the 1997/9 policy, some influential managers 
within the organization concluded that a robust approach 
was needed, rather than the more consensual one recom-
mended by EPAU. Indeed, EPAU itself came under consider-
able criticism for its negative assessment of UNHCR’s urban 
refugee programs, in addition to the fact that from 1999 
onwards, all of the organization’s evaluation reports were 
placed in the public domain and protected from editorial 
interference by senior management. 
The lack of consensus within UNHCR at this time, which 
played a key role in obstructing the formulation of an entirely 
new urban refugee policy, was compounded by other factors.
The first was weak organizational leadership. Serving as 
UN high commissioner for refugees between 2001 and 2005, 
Ruud Lubbers, the former Dutch prime minister, did not 
prioritize the question of urban refugees and did not take a 
clear stand on the direction of UNHCR’s urban refugee policy. 
Despite the very clear commitments made to review and 
revise the 1997 policy, the issue was left unresolved.
Second, UNHCR was not held accountable for its failure to 
meet those commitments. The NGO community periodically 
complained that the organization had failed to move forward 
in the way that had been promised to them, but they could 
bring little real pressure to bear on the organization’s leader-
ship. The Executive Committee, which in principle was bet-
ter placed to require action from UNHCR on this matter, also 
chose to stand back from the impasse that had emerged.
Finally, UNHCR’s failure to resolve the urban refugee issue 
in the first half of the 2000s likely also owed something to 
personnel changes. Specifically, when the head of EPAU was 
seconded from UNHCR to another agency in 2004, the per-
son chosen to replace him was the main author of the 1997 
urban refugee policy. 
Apparently concerned with the way in which EPAU’s recent 
work had criticized and contradicted that policy, the incom-
ing head of the unit initiated a new round of field missions 
and consultations in 2005 and 2006. When that initiative 
failed to produce a viable new policy, responsibility for the 
urban refugee issue was transferred to the Department for 
International Protection (DIP), which had never been com-
fortable with EPAU’s increasingly influential role in formula-
tion of global UNHCR policy. Once again, the unit’s Guiding 
Principles and Good Practice paper was put to one side, and 
DIP began to prepare its own draft policy on urban refugees. 
New Policy Drivers
From 1999 to 2005, the constraints identified in the previous 
section of this article paralyzed policymaking within UNHCR. 
While the organization had clearly committed to review and 
revise its approach to the urban refugee issue, it was simply 
unable to reach closure on the matter. In the course of the 
2000s, however, some important new policy drivers were 
emerging—which eventually overcame the obstacles to the 
formulation of a new policy. 
First, UNHCR was increasingly obliged to engage with 
refugees in countries where refugees were not compelled 
to live in camps. In this respect, the post-2003 exodus from 
war-torn Iraq was of particular significance. During this 
period, hundreds of thousands of Iraqis (the precise number 
was never verified) left their country of origin, most of them 
fleeing to Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. Many had an urban 
and middle-class background, were well educated, and had 
no intention of living in a refugee camp. Instead, they rented 
and shared accommodation, dispersed throughout the cities 
and towns of their asylum countries.19 
This settlement pattern also coincided with the prefer-
ences of those states. Having gone through very difficult 
experiences with the Palestinian refugees on their territory, 
Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria had no interest in having the 
Iraqi refugees concentrated in overcrowded locations where 
their frustration might take a threatening political form. As 
a result, no camps were established for them. 
At the same time, and in other parts of the world, the 
notion of preventing the “irregular” movement of refugees 
from one country to another and from camps to urban 
areas—a primary component of the 1997 policy—were prov-
ing to be fanciful. 
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A growing proportion of the world’s refugees found them-
selves trapped in protracted displacement. Confronted with 
the prospect of being confined to camps for years on end, 
without access to land, livelihoods, or the labour market, 
and with declining levels of humanitarian assistance, refu-
gees were increasingly “voting with their feet,” ignoring the 
restrictions placed on their freedom of movement, and mov-
ing to countries and cities where they could eke out a living 
in the informal sector. 
In Kenya, for example, the authorities maintained a for-
mal policy of “strict encampment,” requiring refugees to 
obtain authorization from the authorities and UNHCR if they 
wished to leave the organized settlements at Dadaab and 
Kakuma in the remote north of the country.20 
In practice, however, growing numbers of refugees from 
Somalia and other parts of the Horn of Africa made their 
way to Nairobi, many of them taking up residence in the 
neighbourhood of Eastleigh. By the mid-2000s, the area 
had been dubbed “Little Mogadishu.” This trend was in clear 
contradiction to UNHCR’s plan to return prima facie refugees 
to organized camps and settlements. 
Another new policy driver in the post-1997 era was to 
be found in the changing demographics of the urban refu-
gee population and UNHCR’s increased sensitivity to social 
diversity. 
From the 1960s onwards, it had been article of faith in 
UNHCR that the vast majority of urban refugees were young, 
single, and able-bodied men, a self-selecting group who had 
the physical and mental attributes needed to survive in the 
city. But this stereotype was now being challenged. As the 
number of urban refugees expanded globally, a growing 
proportion of them came from other sections of the fam-
ily and community. This was particularly the case with Iraqi 
refugees, among whom it was common for households to 
move as a whole, often using the family car as their means 
of transport.21 
At the same time, UNHCR was becoming increasingly aware 
of the need to better understand the different social groups 
to be found within the refugee populations it was supporting. 
In the 1990s, the organization began to give much greater 
attention to the specific needs of refugee women and chil-
dren, an approach that later evolved into a strategy known as 
Age, Gender, and Diversity Mainstreaming (AGDM). 
Introduced in 2004, AGDM required UNHCR’s field offices 
to be “aware of differences within their populations of con-
cern,” with particular attention to the situation of women 
and girls, men and boys, adolescents, older people, those 
with disabilities, and members of minority groups.22 
Such concerns were largely absent from the 1997 urban 
refugee policy, which included a single paragraph on refu-
gee women and self-sufficiency. In this respect, it became 
increasingly clear that a major policy revision would be 
required if UNHCR’s commitment to AGDM was to be taken 
seriously. 
UNHCR’s new focus on social diversity came at a time 
when many other aspects of global refugee policy were being 
reconsidered, within and outside UNHCR. During the 1980s 
and 1990s, the default response to refugee emergencies had 
been to accommodate the new arrivals in camps, to sustain 
them with “care and maintenance” assistance programs, and 
to wait for the day when conditions improved in the country 
of origin. At that point, repatriation could be promoted and 
organized. 
From the end of the 1990s onwards, this model of refu-
gee response was subject to sustained critique from UNHCR 
staff members, academic analysts, and advocates who drew 
attention to three issues: the adverse consequences of long-
term encampment for people who found themselves trapped 
in protracted refugee situations; the growing mobility and 
agency of refugees and the determination of many to estab-
lish their own livelihoods rather than rely on assistance; and 
the inadequacies and dangers of an approach that placed 
primary emphasis on the early—and sometimes premature—
repatriation of refugees.23
Finally, the limitations of UNHCR’s restrictive urban refu-
gee policy were exposed when, in the final quarter of 2005, 
refugees in Cairo launched a sit-in protest close to the organ-
ization’s offices to draw attention to the daily difficulties with 
which they were confronted. On 30 December,  Egyptian 
security  personnel forcibly and brutally removed the refu-
gees, twenty-eight of whom were killed in the operation. 
According to one analysis of these events, UNHCR 
“adopted a hostile and confrontational attitude” towards the 
refugees, “issued statements that accused the protesters of 
everything  from rumour mongering  to outright deception,” 
and adopted an attitude that “served to confirm the protest-
ers’ grievances and frustrations.”24 
It was in this context that Antonio Guterres, a former 
prime minister of Portugal, was appointed to the position 
of UN high commissioner for refugees in 2005. Assessing the 
challenges confronting him and his organization, Guterres 
reached a number of conclusions; first, that the organization’s 
work had to be underpinned by a much better understand-
ing of what he called “global mega-trends,” including urbani-
zation, international migration, and climate change; second, 
that UNHCR should work more actively to find solutions 
to refugee situations—and to engage refugees themselves 
more fully in that process; and third, that UNHCR’s activities 
had to be more firmly based on fundamental human rights 
principles. 
As the high commissioner said in a conversation with the 
author of this article, who in 2006 was appointed head of a new 
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Policy Development and Evaluation Service (PDES), “We can 
no longer collude with states in confining refugees to camps 
and denying them the right to exercise freedom of movement.”
Acting upon these conclusions, in 2007 Guterres initiated 
annual and multi-stakeholder consultations known as the 
High Commissioner’s Dialogue on Protection Challenges. 
The first examined UNHCR’s mandate for protection and 
solutions in international migration. The 2008 Dialogue 
addressed protracted refugee situations. And for 2009, 
Guterres decided that the issue for discussion should be 
urban refugees.
This placed the rest of the organization in a serious dilemma. 
Ten years previously, the organization had promised to thor-
oughly review and revise UNHCR’s urban refugee policy. It 
had not attained that objective, despite several efforts to do 
so and in the face of constant pressure from the NGO com-
munity. There was now a serious risk that the high commis-
sioner would have to convene his December 2009 Protection 
Dialogue without a new urban refugee policy being in place, a 
highly embarrassing scenario for the organization. 
With time becoming increasingly short, swift action had 
to be taken. In July 2009, the assistant high commissioner for 
protection concluded that the latest draft policy paper pre-
pared by DIP was not fit for the purpose. Following a major 
evaluation of UNHCR’s work with Iraqi refugees in urban 
areas of the Middle East,25 the head of PDES was asked to 
draft a new urban refugee policy in the following month. The 
resulting paper drew extensively from the Guiding Princi-
ples and Good Practice paper prepared by EPAU in 2003 and 
was issued as UNHCR’s new policy in September 2009, two 
months ahead of the High Commissioner’s Dialogue. 
In addition to drawing heavily from the 2003 paper, the 
new policy incorporated many ideas and initiatives that had 
emerged in the field. Confronted with a growing number of 
urban refugees, and in the absence of clear directions from 
Headquarters, UNHCR staff had in many instances developed 
their own urban refugee strategies. In that respect, practice 
had run ahead of policy. 
The 2009 Policy 
In both tone and content, the 2009 urban refugee policy set 
out to dissociate itself as far as possible from its 1997 prede-
cessor. In what almost amounted to an admission of failure, 
the new document stated, “Rapid urbanization is one the 
most significant ‘mega-trends’ confronting our planet today. 
It is also an issue that interacts with and reinforces many 
other global developments, including climate change, envi-
ronmental degradation, volatile commodity prices, financial 
and economic instability, and the absence of decent work for 
growing numbers of young people. In this context, UNHCR 
has considered it essential to reconsider the organization’s 
position on the issue of refugees in urban areas and to adopt 
an approach to this matter that is more positive, constructive 
and proactive than has been the case in the past.”26
“Urban areas,” the policy went on to assert, “are a legiti-
mate place for refugees to reside and to enjoy their rights.” 
“The purpose of the policy is to create an environment that 
is conducive for refugee protection and solutions in urban 
areas.” “The rights of refugees and UNHCR’s responsibilities 
towards them are not affected by their location or their sta-
tus in national legislation.” In other words, UNHCR would 
endeavour to provide urban refugees with protection and 
solutions, even in countries that required refugees to live in 
camps and refused to recognize those who had previously 
found protection in other countries of asylum. 
On the three issues that had dominated the 1997 policy, 
the new document attempted to tread a much more protec-
tion-sensitive path. Instead of focusing on the violent and 
disruptive nature of urban refugees, the 2009 policy placed 
much more emphasis on the need to develop better com-
munications and more harmonious relations with them: 
“UNHCR’s relationship with refugees in urban areas has on 
occasions been a tense one, characterized by a degree of 
mutual suspicion … To counter such difficulties, UNHCR’s 
community outreach and communications efforts will form 
part of a broader strategy to establish a constructive dialogue 
and positive partnership with refugees in urban areas.”
While UNHCR senior management required some refer-
ence to onward movement, the words irregular and unregu-
lated were studiously avoided, as was the issue of returning 
refugees to their countries of first asylum:
The issue of “secondary” or “onward” movements has proven to 
be a very complex and controversial one, and cannot be explored 
at length in this paper, which is focused on the issue of providing 
protection and solutions to refugees in urban areas. On one hand, 
attempts to identify refugees who have engaged in “unnecessary” 
onward movements and to return them to their country of first 
asylum are fraught with numerous practical problems and ethical 
dilemmas. On the other hand, there remains an unresolved debate 
on the meaning and measurement of “effective protection” and the 
circumstances under which it is legitimate for a refugee or asylum 
seeker to move from one country to another. 
And while the 2009 document continued to emphasize 
the need to limit assistance to urban refugees and to promote 
their self-reliance, it did so in a way that gave much greater 
recognition to the complexity of these objectives and the 
prerequisites for them to be attained: 
While it is usually taken for granted that camp-based refugees 
will receive indefinite assistance if they are unable to engage in 
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agriculture and other economic activities, it is sometimes assumed 
that refugees in urban areas are able to cope in the absence of such 
support. That is not necessarily the case, especially in countries 
where refugees have no legal status or residency rights [and] are 
not allowed to engage in income-generating activities … In circum-
stances such as these, particular care will be taken by UNHCR to 
identify those refugees who need support and to determine and 
provide the level of assistance they require. At the same time, host 
governments will be encouraged to remove any legal obstacles 
which prevent refugees from becoming self-reliant.
Finally, while the 1997 urban refugee policy had not 
included a section on the issue of protection, the 2009 docu-
ment used the notion of “protection space” as its organizing 
principle. “When refugees take up residence in an urban area, 
whether or not this is approved by the authorities, UNHCR’s 
primary objective will be to preserve and expand the amount 
of protection space available to them … While the notion of 
protection space does not have a legal definition, it is a con-
cept employed by the Office to denote the extent to which a 
conducive environment exists for the internationally recog-
nized rights of refugees to be respected and their needs to 
be met.”
Implementation and Outstanding Issues
With the personal backing of the high commissioner, dedi-
cated financial support from the US government, and the 
general endorsement of the High Commissioner’s Dialogue, 
the implementation of the 2009 policy has assumed a far 
more robust form than had been possible in the contested 
1997 document. 
In summary, an internal Urban Refugee Steering Group 
was established to oversee implementation of the new policy, 
an entity that was later expanded to include NGO representa-
tion. Evaluation and support missions were undertaken to 
eight countries with significant number of urban refugees, 
while in 2012 a global survey was undertaken to identify 
which elements of the new policy that were being imple-
mented most effectively and consistently.27
An urban refugee learning program was established for 
UNHCR and partner staff, while operational guidelines were 
prepared for education, health, and livelihoods programs in 
urban areas. An “urban good practices” website was created 
to facilitate the exchange of ideas and information among 
humanitarian personnel in different cities around the 
world,28 while UNHCR staff, government, and NGO personnel 
were brought together in regional consultations, focusing 
on lessons learned and future strategies in relation to urban 
refugees.29
While this range of activities is emblematic of the impor-
tance that UNHCR has placed on its new urban refugee policy, 
it would be misleading to suggest that implementation has 
been problem-free. 
First, UNHCR made no attempt to assess the financial and 
human resource implications of the new document prior to 
its introduction. A frequent complaint from the field has 
been that staff are expected to engage much more thoroughly 
with urban refugees, but have not been given the capacity to 
do so. 
At the same time, donor states have complained that the 
opaque nature of UNHCR’s budgets make it almost impossi-
ble to determine how much resource allocations for urban 
refugee programs have been adjusted in response to the new 
policy. In some countries with relatively large camp-based 
populations and a proportionately small number of urban 
refugees, UNHCR staff have questioned the wisdom of refo-
cusing resources from the former to the latter. 
Second, while UNHCR has been unambiguous in stating 
that the implementation of its urban refugee policy does 
not rely on the agreement of host states, those countries 
continue to influence the way that urban refugee issues are 
addressed. In Tajikistan, for example, a large proportion of 
the country’s refugee population are forbidden by law from 
taking up residence in the capital city of Dushanbe.30 In 
Kenya, authorities have continued to express a strong prefer-
ence for encampment and have been engaged in a periodic 
and brutal campaign to rid Nairobi of its Somali refugees 
and to relocate them—first to Dadaab and ultimately to their 
country of origin.31
Third, the 2009 policy recognized that UNHCR would 
have to find new ways to work in urban contexts, and in 
that respect set great store in the establishment of coopera-
tive relationships with non-traditional partners, including 
mayors, municipal councils, civil society, and faith-based 
organizations, as well as development actors whose pro-
grams targeted the urban poor. 
Progress in this respect has been slower and less substan-
tive than anticipated, partly because of the unfamiliarity of 
such organizations to UNHCR staff, but also because urban 
refugees usually constitute a very small proportion—and 
a foreign proportion—of the urban poor. In Nairobi, for 
example, the refugee population is estimated to be 100,000 
at most. But that figure has to be considered in relation to 
the fact that the city accommodates around 2.5 million slum 
dwellers, or 60 per cent of its population. In such contexts, 
asking non-traditional partners to take greater account of 
the urban refugee population is always going to be an uphill 
task.32 
Finally, while UNHCR and its partners have focused very 
intensively on implementation of the urban refugee policy 
during the past five years, the discourse on this matter has 
become progressively diffuse. 
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On one hand, a new area of policymaking has emerged 
for the humanitarian needs of urban populations affected by 
armed conflict, civil unrest, natural disasters, and medical 
epidemics. Refugees have received little specific attention in 
this emerging area. At the same time, UNHCR and its part-
ners are now complementing their attention to the issue of 
urban refugees with a more general focus on the situation of 
refugees who are living outside of camps. 
This development is closely related to the eruption of the 
Syrian refugee situation in the Middle East—an emergency 
involving more than four million refugees, some 85 per cent of 
whom are living alongside members of the local population in 
urban, peri-urban, and rural areas of Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, 
northern Iraq, and Turkey. While the 2009 policy was formu-
lated on the assumption that the number of urban refugees 
would expand, it simply did not anticipate these events.33 
And it is for exactly that reason that in 2014 UNHCR intro-
duced a new policy on “alternatives to camps,” “extending 
the principal objectives of the urban refugee policy to all 
operational contexts.”34 In that respect, the 2009 document 
has had an influence that is much broader than anticipated 
by those responsible for its formulation.
Conclusion
The evolution of UNHCR’s urban refugee policy provides 
insights into the way that the organization functions and, 
more specifically, the way in which its policymaking is influ-
enced by competing entities within the institution, by the 
interests of different external stakeholders, and by broader 
operational and intellectual trends.
For future research, there is considerable scope for the 
drivers and constraints identified in this article to be applied 
to other policy areas and to other key actors in the global 
refugee regime.
With respect to UNHCR, for example, it would be of inter-
est to know whether the slow and tortuous nature of poli-
cymaking in relation to urban refugees has also been mani-
fested in other global issues, such as the organization’s role in 
internally displaced people, stateless populations, and those 
affected by climate change and natural disasters.35 
At the same time, our understanding of the way in which 
global refugee policy is formulated would benefit from a 
more concerted analysis of the role and influence of indi-
vidual donor states, host countries, other international 
organizations, NGOs, and academics, as well as bodies such 
as the UNHCR Executive Committee, UN General Assembly, 
and Security Council. 
While UNHCR enjoys significant autonomy in its poli-
cymaking and is not obliged to seek formal approval for 
the policy documents it produces, the organization has an 
evident interest in taking account of the opinions of these 
other stakeholders. The way in which these opinions are 
both solicited and brought to the attention of UNHCR’s senior 
management is a subject worthy of further research. 
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